STATISTICAL BACKGROUND by Ellis, Frank
STATISTICAL BACKGROUND
Frank Ellis
This paper provides a statistical summary of (a) the background of
world oil consumption and production (b) estimates of producer
revenues, import costs for developed and developing countries, and
the financial implications for non-oil-producing developing countries.
Under the assumption that masses of data are generally somewhat
indigestible tables have been kept as straightforward as possible.
Units of measurement have been standardised so that oil is always in
barrels, or barrels per day; money is always in current dollars. It is
hoped that the outcome allows for a fairly rapid assimilation of the
statistical basis underlying many of the arguments to be found in the
other contributions to this bulletin.
The background: world energy market; galloping oil demand; uneven
pattern of world consumption (Tables 1-4)
A simple arithmetic of growth in world energy demand and supply
underlies the current state of affairs. World energy consumption has
been growing at a compound rate of some 5.6% per annum
throughout the last decade. This corresponds to a doubling time of
13 years. In the last three decades alone man has used up more
energy than all previous cumulative usage, and extrapolating current
trends this is expected to occur again by 1985.1 The chief means of
meeting the extra annual requirement for energy has been oil: the
proportion of oil in total energy consumption growing from 29% in
1950 to over 50% in 1972. (Table 1).
The demand for oil more than doubled between 1950 and 1960, and
then doubled again from 1960 to 1970 (compound growth rate in
each decade of 8%). Consumption rose from 9.7 million barrels per
day in 1950 to 51.3 million by 1972. (Table 2). There was a further
rise of 11.3% in the first nine months of 1973 over the corresponding
period of 1972. Given world proven reserves of 672 billion barrels in
1 Jahangir Amuzegar. The Oil Story: Facts, Fiction and Fair Play. Foreign
Affairs, July 1973.
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1973 and assuming no further discoveries, supplies would be
exhausted at current growth rates of consumption in little over 30
years. Of course there will be new discoveries, and the rate of growth
of consumption may slow down as a consequence of recent events,
but the broad magnitudes of these trends nevertheless have
important implications.
As might be expected, both the level and growth rates of oil
consumption are grossly unevenly distributed across the face of the
globe. North America consumes 34% of the world total (63% in
1950); Western Europe 26% (12½% in 1950); and Japan 9%
(negligible in 1950). Asia, Africa and Latin America with 70% of the
world's population consumed only 13% of total consumption in
1972 - a proportion which has fallen slightly since 1950 (14%)
(Table 3). The most startling rates of increase in consumption accrue
to Japan, followed by Western Europe; the former indulging in an
increase of some 9000% between 1950 and 1970 (Table 2).
The order of magnitude of these inequalities in the distribution of
consumption is confirmed with respect to the use of petroleum
products (Table 4). North America with 6% of the world's
population has an annual per capita consumption of petroleum of
0.07 1 b/d. Asia (29% of population) and Africa (10% of population)
have annual per capita consumptions of 0.0024 and 0.0022 b/d
respectively. North America has one motor vehicle for every two
people in its entire population, Asia and Africa have one for every
110 persons and one for 85 persons respectively.
There is more to the colossal increases in oil consumption by the
industrialised countries than a rise in volume. The international price
of crude oil fell throughout the 1950s and 1960s from $2.17 per
barrel in 1948 to as low as $1.25 per barrel in 1970. This process
occurred as a consequence of production capacity rising at an even
faster rate than the immediate increases in consumption; allied to
(a) the oligopolistic operations of the oil majors aimed at expanding
available markets at the maximum rate; (b) the short-sightedness of
consuming countries in acting as if oil were an unlimited resource and
basing their notion of its value on short run marginal production cost
criteria; (c) the low returns to producer governments. The price of
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oil has been below both its own longer term scarcity value in terms
of reserve depletion, and the opportunity cost of alternative energy
sources: a characteristic which has not only been a significant
contributory factor to the rapidity of industrial growth in rich
countries, but has also resulted in excessive and inefficient energy
use. The outcome is summed up by one writer on the energy situation
as follows: "By an economic myopia of incomprehensible dimensions,
millions upon millions of energy-gobbling products - from
impractically big and fast cars to profligately trivial household
gadgets - were allowed to flood the market, only to be replaced by
soon by bigger, faster and more power-thirsty models".2
In addition to encouraging inefficient usage, the low price of oil has
(a) helped to keep the price of substitutes down, and has therefore
dampened research and development of their potential uses, and (b)
delayed research into unconventional substitutes.
TABLE 1
Share of oil in the growth of world energy consumption, 1950-1972
per cent
Source: Institute of Petroleum, Oil: World Statistics 1973
2 Jahangir Amuzegar, op. cit.
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1950 1960 1970 1972
Oil 29 38 49 52
Natural gas 10 15 20 20
Solid fuels 60 45 29 20
Hydro-electric and nuclear 1 2 2 8
TOTAL loo 100 100 100
Million barrels per day
oil equivalent 28.9 42.0 71.1 76.8
STATISTICAL BACKGROUND
TABLE 2
Growth ¡n world petroleum product consumption1 1950-1970
1,000 barrels per day
Notes
1 Consumption includes inland demand for all petroleum products, refinery fuel
and loss, bunkers and military consumption where available.
2 Western Europe: includes Yugoslavia. Asia: excludes Japan, includes Australia
and New Zealand. Latin America: includes Caribbean, with Cuba.
Source: International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1973, pp. 268-274.
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Region2 1950 1960 1970
Middle East 254 578 1,070
Western Europe 1,198 3,846 12,450
North America 6,104 10,529 15,875
Centrally Planned 847 2,920 6,760
Japan 41 664 3,846
Asia 334 827 2,342
Africa 171 355 704
Latin America 741 1,593 2,793
TOTAL 9,690 21,312 46,247
s'lA'I'ls'rICAL BACKGROUND
TABLE 3
Regional distribution of world petroleum consumption 1950-1972
1,000 barrels per day
* preliminary
Source: International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1973,(cited Table 2)
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Region
1950 1960 1970 1972*
% % % %
Middle East 254 3 578 3 1,070 2 1,363 3
Western Europe 1,198 12 3,846 18 12,450 28 13,532 26
North America 6,104 63 10,529 49 15,875 34 17,589 34
Centrally Planned 847 8 2,920 14 6,760 14 7,695 15
Japan 41 - 664 3 3,846 8 4,540 9
Asia 334 4 827 4 2,342 6 2,627 5
Africa 171 2 255 2 704 2 867 2
Latin America 741 8 1,593 7 2,793 6 3,168 6
TOTAL 9,690 100 21,312 100 46,247 100 51,381 100
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TABLE 4
World consumption pattern of petroleum products 1971
Source: International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1973
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Region Population
(million)
Petroleum
consumption
(1,000 b/d)
Petroleum
consumption
(bld per capita)
Vehicle
population
(million)
Vehicles
per 1 .000
people
Middle East 112 1,259 0.011 1.6 14
Western
Europe 358 13,007 0.036 75.7 212
North
America 229 16,361 0.071 116.5 509
Centrally
Planned 1,174 7,184 0.006 12.0 10
Japan 105 4,179 0.039 17.6 168
Asia 1,076 2,537 0.002 10.0 9
Africa 363 788 0.002 4.5 12
Latin
America 287 2,988 0.010 11.6 40
WORLD 3,705 48,303 0.013 249.3 52
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Strategic situation of OPEC: geographical concentration of world
reserves; OPEC command of production and international trade.
(Ttbles 5-7)
While control over a large proportion of current production or
international trade is a necessary condition for short-term cartel-type
action on world markets, it is control over world reserves which
provides the sufficient condition for this action to be maintained in
the longer term. By a quite fortuitous accident of geographical
location of natural resources the five Persian Gulf countries alone
come quite close to satisfying all the conditions for sustaining the
OPEC strategy in the long term.
World proven oil reserves stood at 672.7 billion barrels at the
beginning of 1973, of which some 53% were located in the Middle
East and 16% in North Africa and Nigeria. Total reserves in OPEC
member countries are 435 billion barrels or nearly 65% of global
reserves (Table 5).
OPEC's Iong-termstrategic position is stronger than this proportion
suggests. Most remaining reserves are located in countries with
consumption requirements in excess of their maximum actual or
potential production rates; and which therefore have to deplete at a
rate which gives little room for flexibility with regard to the future.
For example, although North America has reserves of 52.8 billion
barrels, it is seriously deficient in current production, and at the
current rate of depletion (10.9 million barrels per day) will exhaust
those reserves in less than 15 years. A similar argument applies to the
new reserves very provisionally estimated at 30 billion barrels
discovered in the North Sea. If the UK exploits these at the
maximum rate (which it is under considerable pressure to do; given
its economic weaknesses and balance of payments difficulties)
estimated at seven million barrels per day, the reserves would be
exhausted in 12 years. Even at a lower rate of three million barrels
per day, the known North Sea reserves would run out in 25-30 years.
Some Persian Gulf States are altogether in a different situation: at
current production their reserves will last for 40-50 years; and (as
will become evident further on) they have no great incentive for
increasing this production to match industrialised countries' demand.
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The uneveness observed in world consumption is matched by an
uneven geographical distribution of world production which has
increasingly come to favour the potential for a cartel of producing
states. The Middle East's share of world production has grown from
17% in 1950 to 37% in 1972, Africa's share from 0.4% to 11%. This
corresponds to a fall in the dominance of North America from 53% to
22%. OPEC's share of world production in 1972 was 52.8% (Table 6).
More critical in the short-term than production share has been the
growing dominance of OPEC countries in the volume of crude ou
entering world trade. The official picture for 1972, which includes
quite a high proportion of intra-trade amongst industrialised
countries, gives OPEC a 72% share in world oil exports (Table 7). If
we ignore the intra-rich country flows (which mainly reflect
locations of stocks and refining capacities) the OPEC share of world
exports looks more like 90% - a proportion easily high enough to
ensure that no retaliatory action in the form of using non-OPEC
sources of supply was possible for the consuming countries.
TABLE 5
Distribution of world proven oil reserves 1 January 1973
Source: International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1973; BP Statistical Review of the
World Oil Industry, 1972.
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Area
Billion
Barrels
%
Share
of
Total
Middle East 355.3 52.8
Africa 106.4 15.8
Latin America 32.7 4.9
North America 52.8 7.8
Asia and Pacific 14.9 2.2
Western Europe 12.6 1.9
Centrally Planned 98.0 14.6
WORLD TOTAL 672.7 100.0
OPEC 434.6 64.6
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TABLE 6
Regional distribution of world crude oil production 1950-1972
1,000 barrels per day
Source: International Petroleum Encyclopedia 1973
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1950 1960 1970 1972
Region % % % %
Middle East 1,756 17 5,278 25 13,951 31 18,658 37
Western Europe 69 06 285 1 372 1 374 1
North America 5,487 53 7,580 36 10,894 24 10,982 22
Centrally Planned 860 8 3,266 16 7,812 17 8,750 16
Asia 238 2 546 3 1,360 3 1,889 4
Africa 46 0.4 285 1 6,038 13 5,676 11
Latin America 1,963 19 3,728 18 5,172 11 4,831 9
TOTAL 10,419 100 20,968 100 45,599 100 51,160 100
OPEC - - - - 23,255 51.0 27,01252.8
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TABLE 7
International trade in oil 1972
1,000 barrels per day
Source: BP Statistical Review of the World Oil Industry, 1972
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Area
Exports Imports
%
Share of
total
%
Share of
total
Middle East 16,950 56.2 120 0.4
Africa (N &W) 5,390 17.4 130 0.5
Africa (rest) & Asia 1,100 3.6 2,205 7.2
Latin America 3,710 12.5 2,050 3.8
West Europe 325 1.1 14,060 46.4
Centrally Planned 1,260 4.5 380 1.3
USA 225 0.8 4,740 16.2
Canada 1,085 3.5 915 2.9
Japan - 0.0 4,785 15.7
Others 50 0.4 710 5.6
TOTAL TRADED 30,095 100.0 30,095 100
OPEC 21,668 72.0 - -
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Increase in oil prices: OPEC revenues; oil import costs of rich
countries (Tables 8-12)
On 23 December 1973 the OPEC countries meeting in Vienna
announced a new posted price of $11.65 per barrel to come into
effect from 1 January 1974 (four times the January 1973 price).
This price relates to a reference quality oil of Persian Gulf origin
(light oil 34° API) and is based on a revenue per barrel objective of
$7.00. The price has since been confirmed for two further periods of
three months from 1 April, and from 1 July 1974.
The posted price is a "shadow" price used by oil exporters as a basis
for computing government revenues (royalties and taxes). The
structure of international market prices implied by the $11.65 level
therefore depends primarily on two considerations (a) an absolute
floor to the market is provided by the tax paid cost of crude oil to
the petroleum companies. With an average tax of about $7.50 per
barrel (taking into account different qualities of Persian Gulf crudes);
and production and internal distribution costs to oil companies of
$0.68 per barrel, this implies an average fob price of about $8.18 in
the Persian Gulf; (b) account should also be taken of the differential
qualities of alternative oil sources (for instance the Libyan equivalent
of the above posted price is $15.768 per barrel).
The success of some OPEC members in obtaining much higher prices
than this in the period November 1973 to February 1974 reflected
immediate shortages in marginal supplies following cutbacks of 4.7
million b/d in the Persian Gulf in October 1973. It also reflected a
scramble for supplies by industrial countries uncertain as to whether
their basic requirements would be met.
Table 8 contains World Bank estimates of market prices through to
1980. These estimates relate to the reference oil quality (34° API)
and are made under quite conservative assumptions (a 6.9% per
annum increase in current prices equivalent to a real increase of 1.1%
per annum for the medium estimate - the low estimate implies a
slight decrease in real terms). These assumptions give a range of
between $10 and $14 a barrel, with a medium estimate of $12 a
barrel for 1980.
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Table 11 gives the World Bank estimates of the revenues which will
accrue to OPEC countries as a consequence of the price estimates
contained in Table 8. The analysis is dependent on forecasts of the
rate at which OPEC will expand production in the next decade
(Table 9). The assumptions are made that growth in world energy
consumption will slow down to 4.7% compound during the 1970s
and 4.2% by 1980. The proportion of oil in this consumption would
rise to 61% giving a demand for oil of 70 million b/d in 1980. In
order for this demand to be satisfied, OPEC would increase
production from 29 million b/d in 1973 to 42 million b/d by 1980.
This may be a somewhat optimistic estimate, as virtually the only
incentive to increase production in the Persian Gulf is pressure from
consuming countries; and in view of the surpluses which will accrue
from the current level of prices (provided they can be maintained) it
is unlikely that such an incentive will alone carry much weight.
Based on the assumptions at the start of the previous paragraph,
revenues are calculated to rise from $85 billion in 1974 to between
$142 and $200 billion in 1980. The 1974 figure is slightly less than
the $100 billion figure which was being bandied about by the press
earlier in the year, but not sufficiently so to alter the conclusions
materially. If it is assumed that Algeria, Nigeria, Indonesia and
Venezuela find ready uses for all their surpluses, and further assumed
that the Middle Eastern countries will absorb a sum equal to their
total 1973 earnings this would still leave a net surplus of some $40
billion in 1974, which could rise to $100 billion a year by the end of
the decade. A great deal depends on the absorptive capacity of the
exporters with small populations, but there are some estimates that
accumulated surplus revenues could reach $450 to $550 billion by
the end of 1980. This may be compared to official international
liquidity reserves of $190 billion in 1973 including gold, SDRs, IMF
holdings, and foreign exchange reserves.3
The dimensions of international adjustment posed by these figures in
terms of the shift of world economic power are very large. The
Middle East could come to control the future organis:itio1 uf
international rn3netary arrangements (effectively become the world's
3 World Bank estimates.
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central banker)4. The annual interest alone on the sums involved
might reach $40 to $50 billion per annum by 1980. However, these
considerations do not imply a collapse of existing financial
structures, for the governments of Arab countries themselves would
suffer should their actions lead to a serious world depression.
There is general consensus amongst the various estimates of the
implications of 1974 oil prices for the OECD countries. The
additional oil import cost will be of the order of $51 billion, of
which about $32-$33 billion will fall on Western Europe; $10 billion
on the USA; and $9 billion on Japan. In consideration of previous
lorecasts that the OECD area would have a surplus of $10 billion in
1974, the net balance of payments deficit is forecast as ranging from
$33 billion to $40 billion. Such estimates assume an increase in
OPEC imports from OECD of $7 billion which implies a collective
OECD deficit vis a vis OPEC of $44 billion ($51 minus $7 billion).
The avoidance of world recession under these circumstances rests
heavily on OECD countries reaching agreement on the sharing out of
the drop in real living standards implied by the debt. Failure to reach
such agreement could lead to a deflationary spiral (successive
devaluations, deflations, import controls) as each country tries to
throw the burden onto its trading partners. One predictable outcome
is that the dollar will revalue against other OECD currencies. This is
because of (a) the large proportion of OECD reserves held in dollars;(b) the comparatively small impact of the il price rise on the USA;
(e) the greater attractiveness of US securities to OPEC governments.
' For a more detailed discussion of the financial consequences of the oil price
increases see Richard Jolly's paper in this bulletin.
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TABLE 8
The evolution of crude oil prices 1955-1974 (with estimates to 1980)
SAUDI ARABIAN LIGHT (34°) CRUDE OIL fob RAS TANURA
Note: The price of crude oil varies according to its specific gravity and quality.
The example given here is average for Persian Gulf oil. North Africa produces a
generally higher quality oil (higher priced by $2-3 per barrel). The "posted
price" is the price used by oil producers for the purpose of taxation.
Source: World Bank estimates, January 1974
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Date Posted Price2
Estimated
Market Price
% of January
1970 Market Price
($ per barrel) ($ per barrel)
Jan. 1955 1.93 1.93 148
May-June 1957 2.08 1.83 141
Feb. 1959 1.90 1.53 118
Sept. 1960 1.80 1.45 112
Jan. 1970 1.80 1.30 100
Feb. 15, 1971 2.18 1.65 127
Jan. 20, 1972 2.48 1.85 142
Jan. 1, 1973 2.59 2.20 169
Apr. 1, 1973 2.76 2.30 177
June 1, 1973 2.90 2.70 208
Oct. 1, 1973 3.01 2.70-3.10 208/238
Oct. 16, 1973 5.12 3.65 281
Low Medium High
Jan. 1, 1974 11.65 8.00 8.00 8.00 615
Jan. 1, 1975 8.40 8.65 8.88
Jan. 1, 1976 8.74 9.27 9.76
Jan. 1, 1977 9.04 9.88 10.68
Jan. 1, 1978 9.36 10.53 11.68
Jan. 1, 1979 9.69 11.23 12.78
Jan. 1, 1980 10.00 12.00 14.00
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TABLE 9
Petroleum exports from OPEC countries 1972-1980
million bld
Assumptions: (a) World energy consumption to slow down from 5.5%
compound in the 1960s to 4.7% compound in 1970s and 4.2% by 1980.
(b) Oil now representing 57% of world energy consumption (excluding the
centrally planned economies) to grow to 61% by 1980.
Source: World Bank estimates, January 1974
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Actual Projected
Country
1972 1973 1974 1980
Saudi Arabia 5.82 7.04 7.60 11.34
Kuwait 3.13 3.08 3.12 3.21
Abu Dhabi 1.05 1.40 1.75 3.61
Qatar 0.48 0.49 0.53 0.72
Iraq 1.37 1.81 2.12 3.98
Iran 4.70 5.51 5.80 7.94
Algeria 1.02 1.10 1.10 1.19
Libya 2.19 1.97 2.30 2.65
Nigeria 1.78 1.96 2.19 2.92
Indonesia 0.93 1.11 1.16 1.53
Venezuela 3.30 3.43 3.36 3.24
TOTAL 25.76 28.89 31.04 42.32
1972/73 1973/74 1974/75 1976-80
Annual growth 12.2% 7.4% 7.8% 4.7%
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TABLE 10
Estimated OPEC government revenues per barrel; 1972-1980'
uss
1 Based on the prices in Table 8, taking into account adjustments for differing
qualities of oil.
Source: World Bank estimates, January 1974
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Country
Actual Projected
1972 1973 1974 1980
Low Medium High
Saudi Arabia 1.40 1.19 6.99 8.75 10.47 12.18
Kuwait 1.40 1.89 6.97 8.71 10.43 12.15
Abu Dhabi 1.40 2.03 7.50 9.38 11.19 13.00
Qatar 1.40 1.99 7.28 9.06 10.85 12.64
Iraq 1.60 2.21 7.61 9.38 11.50 13.61
Iran 1.41 1.90 7.06 8.83 10.57 12.30
Algeria 1.83 2.74 9.26 10.88 13.16 15.43
Libya 2.12 3.07 9.15 10.90 13.24 15.58
Nigeria 1.84 2.72 8.70 10.60 13.30 16.00
Indonesia 1.45 1.97 5.06 4.25 5.27 6.29
Venezuela 1.60 2.30 8.17 10.20 12.23 14.25
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TABLE 11
Estimated OPEC government revenues, 1972-1980
US $ million
Assumptions: The revenue per barrel estimates of Table 10 and the exports
production estimates of Table 9.
Source: World Bank estimates, January 1974.
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Country 1972 1973 1974 1980Low Medium High
Saudi Arabia 2,988 4,915 19,400 36,300 43,450 50,550
Kuwait 1,600 2,130 7,945 10,250 12,250 14,300
Abu Dhabi 538 1,035 4,800 12,400 14,750 17,150
Qatar 247 360 1,425 2,400 2,900 3,350
Iraq 802 1,465 5,900 13,650 16,750 19,800
Iran 2,423 3,885 14,930 25,650 30,700 35,750
Algeria 680 1,095 3,700 4,750 5,750 6,700
Libya 1,705 2,210 7,990 10,550 12,850 15,100
Nigeria 1,200 1,950 6,960 11,350 14,250 17,100
Indonesia 480 830 2,150 2,400 2,400 3,500
Venezuela 1,933 2,800 10,010 12,100 14,500 16,900
TOTAL 14,515 22,675 85,210 141,800 171,100 200,200
Compound
Annual 1972/73 1973174 1975-80 1975-80 1975-80
Growth: 56.2 275.8 7.9 11.3 14.2
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TABLE 12
The oil cost and balance of payments consequences for OECD countries
1974
$ billion
Note: (a) Calculations by The Economist; 1974 figures described as
"guesstimates".
Assumptions: (a) Oil prices to remain at current levels throughout 1974.
Corrections may easily be made: every change of $ a barrel in the price adds
approx. $10 billion to the total oil bill of OECD countries.
Actual supply will not fall far short of "normal" demand at current prices.
OECD exports to Arab countries will increase by $7 billion in 1974.
Source: The Economist: International Banking Survey, 23 March 1974.
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Country
1973
Balance of
Payments
(estimated)
1974
Additional
import costs
1974
Balance of Payments
forecast range
Reserve
holdings
end 1973
US +1.5 -10.5 - 0.5 to - 3.0 14.4
Canada -0.6 - - 5.8
Japan - - 9.5 -7.5 12.2
UK -3.7 - 4.5 - 7.5 to - 9.0 6.5
France +0.4 - 5.0 -3.5 8.5
Germany +3.8 - 5.5 0.0 to - 1.0 33.1
Italy -2.2 - 4.25 - 5.0 to - 6.0 6.4
Others +4.6
- 12.0 - 8.0 to -11.0 52.9
TOTAL +3.8 -51.0 -33.0 to -40.0 139.8
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Oil import costs of developing countries 19 72-1980: additional
import bills; identification of those countries most seriously affected
in 1974 and 1975. (Tables 13-16)
In 1974 developing countries will be paying about $15 billion for
their oil imports, of which some $10 billion is the additional cost
above 1973 levels implied by an assumed average cif price of $8.8 per
barrel in 1974, and a continued growth (of over 8%) in the volume of
oil imports.
The total bill represents some 20% of projected imports in selected
Third World countries in 1974 a devastating blow to many
countries' ability to continue to sustain planned import levels
required for development programmes. If the prices and volumes
continue to rise, the bill could be some 20% higher in 1975.
Depending on the assumptions made ('1ibIc 13), these bills will be
much higher again in 1980. (Tables 14 and 15).
Both the rates of increase in oil imports needed to sustain growth
plans and the ability to finance the additional costs fall most
unevenly between countries. In the analysis by country given below,
countries have initially been grouped according to whether they are
low income (under $200 per capita), middle incone ($200-375 per
capita), or relatively high income (over $375). Within each group
countries have been selected according to a rough assessment of the
extent to which their development prospects have been damaged by
the recent events in oil and commodity markets. The most important
single index has been additional petroleum costs as a proportion of
total import bills. Taking into account other factors affecting
individual countries, three sets of criteria have been used to identify
the most seriously affected countries.
Per capita income and GNP growth rates as approximate
indications of poverty and economic resilience.
Dependence on petroleum and petroleum-based imports (esp.
fertilisers) as a proportion of total import bills.
Financial ability to meet the increased bills taking into
account:-
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the direct impact of the increased oil costs on their balance of
payments situation in 1974;
the impact of other price changes on the value of their exports
and imports;
their reserves and debt burden, and their potential for
borrowing from normal sources (e.g. IMF) in 1974 and 1975;
the level of their present receipts of official development
assistance in relation to their needs.
The countries chosen for discussion should only be taken as a
tentative list of those most obviously and directly affected by a
worsening of their foreign exchange positions. It must be emphasised
that a number of countries excluded from the selection (because
their oil import bills are comparatively small, at least relative to their
total imports) may nevertheless face serious difficulties, which would
be revealed by a more exhaustive and detailed study of the impact in
each developing country. The data relevant to the discussion by
country may be found in Tables 15 and 16.
A. Low-income countries seriously affected by the increase
in oil prices
(a) India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka
These three countries are the hardest hit of all developing countries
by almost any criterion. All three face serious structural adjustment
problems and severe disruption of development plans as a con-
sequence of the oil price increases. All three should be considered
urgent candidates for any emergency relief plans.
India 's imports of oil could well increase fourfold in value between
1973 and 1975 (from $415 million to $1,675 million). The forecast
rise between 1973 and 1974 alone (about $720 million) equals 32%
of her 1972 imports and about half her foreign exchange reserves.
India has also been hit by the increased price of food. In addition her
own food production will suffer as a consequence of the increased
cost of fertilisers (both imported and home produced). According to
World Bank projections India would have an increased financing need
of about $800 million in 1974 over 1973 as a consequence of the oil
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price increase, of which a maximum of about $600 million could be
covered by existing loan arrangements, drawing down of reserves,
and potential borrowing from IMF and other public loan sources.
This would leave an uncovered deficit of over $200 million. Unless
special help is obtained (e.g. under bilateral arrangements with Iran
or from the new Special Fund of the United Nations), this implies
either very restrictive import policies (with consequent disastrous
results on economic growth and the spread of poverty), or a bigger
expansion of exports (the scope for which is probably quite limited
in the short term).
Bangladesh 's oil imports may well increase by $60 million between
1973 and 1974 (from $35 million to $95 million) representing some
13% of total 1972 imports. With an average income per capita of
only $70 and a negative annual growth rate in the last five years, this
country has a most severe poverty problem which the increase in oil
prices will only exacerbate. Again Bangladesh has also been hit by
the price increases in other commodities and food, with the
consequence that it faces a forecast increased external need of $370
million in 1974, with negligible potential for borrowing or drawing
down on reserves.5
Sri Lanka 's oil imports could rise from $50 million in 1973 to $150
million in 1974; the increase corresponding to 18% of total imports
by value. Again problems are compounded by increases in other
commodity prices. The forecast increased external capital deficit
($93 million in 1974) is staggering in terms of the size
of the economy and Sri Lanka needs urgent assistance to cover
the gap (approximately $40 million) between potential borrowings6
and the total burden.
(b) Pakistan is a borderline case as far as urgent relief is concerned.
Although it faces a similarly colossal increase in oil bills ($180
million in 1974) as its neighbours, the movement in its terms of trade
in other commodities has been favourable and it has good reserves.
World Bank estimatesMarch 1974.
6 Ibid.
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Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania are relatively large oil importers
in the low-income group and the extra oil cost will impose a heavy
burden on their payments situation in 1974 (Kenya: approximately
$60 million; Tanzania: $35 million; Uganda: $25 million).
Kenya and Tanzania might just meet their burdens through
maximum use of potential borrowing sources in 1974, but face
possible heavy deficits in 1975. In addition they are both poor
countries which have benefited little from the commodity boom.
Both Ethiopia and Sudan face large increases in their import
bills from the oil price increases (Ethiopia: some $40 million; Sudan:
$72 million). They are both to some extent borderline cases as far as
urgent additional aid needs are concerned - Ethiopia having
reasonably healthy exchange reserves in spite of the drought; and the
Sudan enjoying higher exchange receipts from her exports of cotton.
However Ethiopia's position can be expected to deteriorate in 1975,
and in view of its low income, the problem of drought and the
increased cost of food and fertiliser, its needs will almost certainly be
urgent. The Sudan may be expected to receive assistance from other
Arab countries.
Zaire is a borderline case. Although facing quite a large extra oil
burden ($45 million in 1974) and being a very poor country (per
capita income $90), its balance of payments has been strengthened
by the high price of copper, and recent oil finds could ease its
situation markedly.
Small oil importers and least-developed countries. There are a
number of countries whose oil imports, although not large in
absolute terms, are quite significant in terms of total imports and
GNP (Mauritania, Laos, Afghanistan). In addition for many of the
least developed countries the increase in oil prices is compounded by
difficulties of drought and the higher prices of food and other
commodities. The Sahelian countries (Chad, Mali, Niger, and Upper
Volta) merit particular attention in these respects.
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B. Middle-income countries seriously affected by the increase in oil
prices
South Korea and the Philippines
These two countries are special cases within the middle-income
group. They both face massive increases in oil costs ($825 million and
$415 million respectively) and are expected to have very large
external capital deficits in 1974 ($580 million and $730 million
respectively)7. Although in both cases reserves have been fairly
healthy in the immediate past, the size of the oil cost increase goes
well beyond the countries' ability to finance them out of reserves or
from normal sources of borrowing. In the case of South Korea the
implications of this burden must be offset against the tremendous
dynamism of the economy, which has seen an average growth rate of
10% between 1965 and 1971, reaching 17% in 1973. It may be
possible for this country to offset at least part of the burden through
increased prices of manufactured exports. The case of the Philippines
is more difficult, though it starts with initially more favourable
reserves.
Thailand faces a massive increase in oil import costs ($420
million in 1974) but this is largely offset by very healthy payments
and resetves and high potential use of external borrowing facilities.
Ivory Coast, Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon and Sierra Leone
The increase in oil costs takes quite a heavy toll of all these
countries' balance of payments and reserves, but there are
compensating factors in their relative levels of income compared to
other African states, and in some cases (for instance, Ghana: cocoa)
increases in the price of their exports will tend to compensate for the
extra import bills. The Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Senegal are
probably in the most'difficult position of countries in this group; the
former two because of very low reserves and low potential use of
further borrowing facilities, the latter with problems of encroaching
drought.
Honduras is a relatively low per capita income country in the
Central American region and faces a heavy import bill in relation
both to its total imports and foreign exchange reserves.
World Bank estimates, March 1974.
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In general countries which fall into the middle-income range will
suffer setbacks to their economic growth in this decade but are more
resilient and have better access to borrowing facilities than
low-income countries. There are no cases in this group as urgent as
several -in the low-income group.
C. Higher-income countries affected by the increase in oil prices
The outlook for countries in the higher income group is generally
much less devastating than for any of the preceding cases. Many of
the group will either gain directly from the new oil prices (e.g. Peru)
or are benefiting from the boom in the prices of other commodities
(for example Zambia, Peru and Chile: copper). Brazil stands out as
having the most massive increase in oil costs of any developing
country ($1,100 million) but enjoys fast-growing exports of
manufactures with substantial reserves and plenty of scope for
outside borrowing, at least in 1974. Jamaica may also have quite a
severe adjustment problem; though again there is a mitigating
circumstance in the value of bauxite exports.
Summary
There are obvious limitations to any attempt to rank countries
according to how seriously they have been hurt by the increase in oil
prices. All non-oil-producing developing countries will suffer greater
or lesser degrees of setback to their development programmes during
the decade. The blow is very much softened however for those
countries which have made compensating windfall gains from the
very large price increases in other commodities and raw materials.
A rough list of those countries most urgently in need of special
assistance, ranked according to the criteria given on pages 34 and 35,
would at the least comprise, in the low income group: India,
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka as the main priority; followed by Kenya,
and Tanzania, which although just being able to finance their own
1974 deficits by maximum external borrowing, do so at considerable
jeopardy to debt and payments prospects in 1975 and after; Ethiopia
and the Sahelian countries of West Africa (Mali, Chad, Niger, Upper
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Volta, Mauritania); Pakistan, possibly Zaire, and possibly some
further least-developed countries not discussed in detail here; and in
the middle-income group: South Korea and the Philippines plus a
second set of West African countries (Senegal, Ivory Coast,
Camero on).
TABLE 13
Oil imports, 1972-1974 and perspectives of price and volume for 1980
excludes Bangladesh
Source: World Bank estimates, January 1974. UN Monthly Bul!etin of Statistics, July 1974 (for total imports 1972)
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Actual 1980 Projected
1972 1973 1974 Low Medium High
Weighted average cif prices for the 14
countries ir) table 14, (5 per barrel) 252 3.39 8.77 10.86 13.09 15.33
Volume of oil imports
(Million barrels)
14 selected countries (see table 14) 663 693 774 1,372 1,372 1,372
All developing countries 1,474 1,547 1,696 2,840 2,840 2,840
Value of oil imports as % of total imports 8 20
Annual growth of oil imports,
all LDCs (per cent) 1971/721972/73 1973/74 1975-80 (pa.)
Volume 8.7 5.0 11.6 9.0
Value 18.6 41.2 183.6 12.5 16.0 19.3
STATISTICAL BACKGROUND
TABLE 14
Oil imports of selected developing countries 1972-1980
$ million
Source: World Bank estimates. January 1974. See Table 13 fo assump ions.
41
Actual 1980 Projected
Developing countries
1972 1973 1974 Low Medium High
Large developing countries
India 265 415 1,350 2,600 3,140 3690
Pakistan 65 85 260 455 545 640
Bangladesh 25 35 95 160 190 225
Selected other countries
Uruguay 40 60 160 285 345 405
Turkey 150 210 560 1,200 1,415 1,640
Morocco 50 80 215 450 550 650
Ghana 20 25 70 150 180 210
Kenya 25 40 115 230 280 325
Sri Lanka 35 50 150 276 330 385
Philippines 185 265 740 1,340 1,625 1.900
Thailand 125 180 510 980 1,185 1,385
Exporters of manufactures
Brazil 425 540 1.425 2,925 3,530 4,150
Korea 205 325 1,075 2,600 1,140 3,690
Argentina 55 40 80 430 520 605
14 Selected Countries Sub-total 1,670 2,3S0 6,805 14,910 17,970 21,030
All Developing Countries 3,715 8,245 14,875 30,815 37,140 43,500
STATISTICAL BACKGROUND
TABLE 15
Incremental oil import expenditures of developing countries due to effect of
price in creases since 1970. (a)
$ million
Note: a) The incremental expenditure is the difference in price between 1970 and the current year, multiplied by
import volume in the current year.
Source: World Bank estimates, January /974. See Table 13 for assumptions.
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Developing countries
Actual Projected 1980
1972 1973 1974 Low Medium High
Large developing countries
India 74 203 1090 2,895 3,600 4,290
Pakistan 18 42 .210 385 475 565
Bangladesh 6 15 75 130 165 /95
Selected Other countries
Uruguay 9 25 120 230 290 350
Turkey 32 77 425 960 1,175 1,400
Morocco 10 24 175 375 475 575
Ghana 4 11 55 120 150 180
Kenya 7 18 90 195 240 290
Sri Lanka 9 24 120 230 285 340
Philippines 45 118 580 1,110 1,390 1,665
Thailand 32 83 400 815 1,020 1.220
Exporters of Manufactures
Brazil 96 222 1,085 2.360 2.965 3,585
Korea 52 148 850 1,155 2.690 3,125
Argentina 11 15 60 335 425 515
14 Selected Countries Sub-Total 405 1,025 5,335 12,295 15,345 18,415
All developing countries 900 2.290 11.635 25,395 31,720 38,080
STATISTICAL BACKGROUND
TABLE 16
A. Data on low-income countries serious! y affected by the increase in oil prices
Note: (a) Obtained by multiplying forecast 1974 oil import volume, by assumed
1973/74 price differential of $6 per barrel
NB: basis of Calculation differs from that used in Tables 13-15
Sources: Cols. (1) to (3): World Bank Atlas 1973; (4) OECD, April 1974; (5) IMF International
Financial Statistics; (7) data from OECD, April 1974.
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Increase in oil bills, Aid receiptsEconomic Indicators 1973/74 1972
(1) (21 (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Income GNP
per growth Population Value As % As % Cross Aid per
capita 1965-71 1971 S m. 1972 of 1971 DAC aid capita
Country 1971 5 % pa. m. (a) imports GNP S m. S
Bangladesh 70 -0.1 72 54 6 1.1 223 3.1
Sri Lanka 100 1.8 13 60 18 4.8 63 4.8
India 110 2.4 551 723 32 1.2 728 1.3
Pakistan 130 3.0 63 156 22 1.9 365 5.8
Ethiopia 80 1.2 25 42 22 2.1 48 1.9
Zaire 90 3.6 19 45 7 2.6 125 6.6
Tanzania 110 3.3 13 33 8 2.2 62 4.8
Sudan 120 -0.9 16 72 23 3.8 42 2.6
Uganda 130 1.6 10 25 10 1.9 47 4.7
Kenya 160 4.3 12 58 10 3.1 110 9.2
STATISTICAL BACKGROUND
TABLE 16
B. Data on middle-income countries seriously affected by the increase in oil prices
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Note: (a) See note to table 16 A.
Sources: See table 16 A.
Economic Indicators Increase in oil bills
1973/74
Aid receirts
1972
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Income GNP
per growth Population Value As % As % Gross Aid per
capita 1965-71 1971 $ m. 1972 of 1971 DAC aid capita
Country 1971 $ % p.a. m. (a) imports GNP $ m. $
South Korea 290 10.0 32 825 33 9.0 372.5 11.6
Philippines 240 2.7 38 414 30 4.5 169.7 4.5
Thailand 210 4.7 37 420 23 5.4 57.3 1.5
Senegal 250 -1.2 4 21 8 2.1 81.3 20.3
Ghana 250 -2.1 9 54 19 2.4 64.0 7.1
Ivory Coast 330 4.4 5 48 11 2.8 77.5 15_5
Sierra Leone 210 4.7 3 9 7 1.7 11.3 3.8
Cameroon 200 3.7 6 14 5 1.2 98.8 16.5
Honduras 300 1.4 3 23 12 2.9 16.6 5.5
STATISTICAL BACKGROUND
TABLE 16
C. Data on higher-income countries seriously affected by the increase in oil prices
Note: (a) See note to table 16 A.
Sources: See table 16 A.
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Economic Indicators Increase in oil bills
1933/74
Aid receïots
1972
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Income GNP
per growth Population Value As % As % Gross Aid per
capita 1965-71 1971 S m. 1972 of 1971 DAC aid capita
Country 1971 S % pa. m. (a) imports GNP S m. S
Brazil 460 5.1 95 1,116 23 2.5 118.4 1.2
Chile 760 2.4 10 210 22 2.8 43.1 4.3
Peru 480 0.5 14 108 14 1.6 40.0 2.9
Dominican Rep. 430 4.7 4 34 9 2.0 28.7 7.2
Mexico 700 2.9 52 150 5 0.4 27.7 0.5
Uruguay 750 0.7 3 107 57 4.9 23.5 7.8
Guatemala 390 2.1 5 35 11 1.7 20.0 4.0
Costa Rica 590 4.5 2 20 5 1.9 16.0 8.0
Panama 820 4.5 1 59 13 4.9 15.9 15.9
Nicaragua 450 1.3 2 33 15 3.5 11.0 5.5
Jamaica 720 3.5 2 72 12 5.3 19.0 9.5
Zambia 380 1.0 4 24 3 1.5 24.8 6.2
